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MODAL LOGICS AND MULTIVERSES
ALEXANDER C. BLOCK AND BENEDIKT L\"owE
We provide a general framework to study modal logics of mul-
tiverses and survey the results on the modal logic of forcing, the
modal logic of grounds, and the modal logic of inner models. We
also provide new results on the modal logic of symmetric exten-
sions.
1. Introduction
This paper is a survey on modal logic of multiverses. It summarizes known results
by Hamkins, Inamdar, Leibman, and the second author about the modal logics of
forcing, grounds, and inner models in a general abstract setting. Most results in
this survey come from a series of papers co-authored by the second author [19, 20,
18, 24]. Exceptions are the discussion of spiked Boolean algebras and the modal
logic of c.c. $c$ . forcing in \S 7.1 (these results were obtained by Inamdar in his Master's
thesis [23] supervised by the second author) and the determination of the modal
logic of symmetric extensions in \S 7.4 due to the rst author.
The study of modal logics of set theoretic constructions started with [15] and
[19]. Various other aspects of the modal logic of forcing are considered in [29, 21,
9, 10, 30, 32, 8, 7, 20, 18]. In \S 2, we explain the natural (and very general)
setting for the study of modal logics of forcing: set theoretic multiverses. After
providing some general background in modal logic in \S 3 and the abstract denition
of modal logics for multiverses in \S 4, we then discuss the main result of [19] in \S 5
and provide the general proof strategy adapted to our general multiverse setting in
\S 6. Finally, in \S 7, we survey various generalisations in the multiverse setting.
2. Set theoretic multiverses
The context in which the investigation of the modal logic of forcing is most naturally
seen is the investigation of the set theoretic multiverse:
The continuum hypothesis CH had been the most prominent open problem of
set theory since Hilbert had listed it as the rst problem on his list of problems
for the 20th century [22]. In 1963, Cohen showed that it can not be solved on the
basis of ZFC [3]. In our context, the following is the most appropriate formulation
of this impossibility result:
Theorem 1. If $M\models$ ZFC, then there are $N,$ $N'$ such that $M\subseteq N$ and $M\subseteq N'$
and
$N\models ZFC+CH$ and $N'\models ZFC+\neg CH.$
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The philosophy of mathematics literature abounds with discussions about what
Cohen's result means:1 Does it mean that the question of the continuum hypothesis
is an unsolvable problem? Does it mean that ZFC is a decient axiom system and
we need to search for new axioms?
Recently, a new view, called the multiverse view, was proposed by Hamkins [17]:
on the multiverse view, Cohen's result is not a problem, but rather (part of) the
answer. Set theorists gain understanding about the truth values of statements in
set theory by understanding their behaviour in the multiverse of models of set
theory. The fact that CH can be made true or false in an extension of every model
of set theory is one important component of understanding the meaning of CH: it
contrasts CH with other statements, e.g., statements that are true in all models of
set theory, statements that are false in all models of set theory, and statements that
can be false, but once they are true, they remain true in forcing $extensions:^{2}$
The multiverse view holds that there are diverse distinct con-
cepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic uni-
verse, which exhibit diverse set-theoretic truths. Each such universe
exists independently in the same Platonic sense that proponents of
the universe view regard their universe to exist. In particular,
I shall argue that the question of the continuum hypothesis is
settled on the multiverse view by our extensive, detailed knowledge
of how it behaves in the multiverse. [17, p. 416-417]
Studying the multiverse as a mathematical entity is not restricted to researchers
who subscribe to the philosophical position of the multiverse view. In his own
work on CH, Woodin (who is not an adherent of the multiverse view) has studied a
particular substructure of the multiverse, the generic multiverse, which is also the
main playing eld for the study of modal logics of forcing. In general, multiverses
are collections of models of set theory, linked by relations that reect that one model
was constructed from another. In full generality, the multiverse should contain all
models of set theory: this makes it meta-mathematically dicult to describe since
it will become a higher-order object.3 In contrast with these very general and
foundational multiverse concepts, we'll be looking at fragments of the multiverse
generated by a xed collection of construction methods. These fragments will live
in second order set theory:
Suppose that we have a meta-universe V of set theory in which we interpret all
statements of our meta-language, like, e.g., $\langle ZFC\vdash\varphi$ We shall assume that our
meta-universe is rich enough to have (countable) set models of set theory, which
will become our main objects of study.4 Of course, this means that we must work
1The literature on the philosophical implication of independence results is vast and we shall
not be able to do it justice by giving references.




Note that we use the slightly ambiguous phrase \models of set theory"' rather than \models
of ZFC" since we want to consider models of ZF in \S 7.4 and because the setting is general enough
to consider other base set theories BST as well. For most of this paper, the phrase $(M$ is a model
of set theory" can be considered as synonymous to $M\models ZFC$ .
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in a relatively strong meta-theory (e.g., ZFC$+$ ZFC is consistent but we shall not
be worried by this.
A model construction in our meta-universe V is a class function $C$ that gets
pairs $(M, p)$ as input where $M\in V$ is a model of set theory and $p\in V$ is a
parameter. Only for some choice of $(M,p)$ will $C(M,p)$ be an appropriate object.
We shall call those pairs $C$ -good. In particular, we shall assume that if $(M,p)$ is
$C$-good, then $C(M,p)$ is a model of set theory. We may add further restrictions,
though. If $V\in V$ is a model of set theory, we can dene the $C$-multiverse of $V$ by
closing under the operation $M\mapsto C(M, p)$ (of course, this recursion happens in the
meta-universe V):
$Mult_{0}^{C}(V):=\{V\},$
$Mult_{n+1}^{C}(V)$ $:=Mult_{n}^{C}(V)\cup\{C(M,p)$ ; $M\in Mult_{n}^{C}(V),p\in V$ and
$(M, p)$ is $C$-good}, and
Mul$t^{}$ (V)
$:= \bigcup_{n\in N}Mult_{n}^{C}(V)$
The $C$-multiverse comes with a natural accessibility relation generated by $C$
where we say that a model $MC$ -accesses another model $N$ $(in$ symbols, $M\leq cN)$
if there is a $p$ such that $(M,p)$ is $C$-good and $N=C(M,p)$ . Depending on $C$ , it
could be that this relation is not transitive. In that case, we could also consider
the transitive closure of $\leq c$ as an accessibility relation.
A natural generalization of this is a multiverse produced by more than one
construction method. We shall not deal with these multiverses in this paper, but
give the appropriate denitions as a reference. Suppose that $C$ is a collection of
construction methods $C:(M,p)\mapsto C(M,p)$ as before. Then
$Mult_{0}^{C}(V):=\{V\},$
$Mult_{n+1}^{C}(V)$ $:=Mult_{n}^{C}(V)\cup\{C(M,p)$ ; $C\in C,$ $M\in Mult_{n}^{C}(V),p\in V$ , and
$(M,p)$ is $C$-good}, and
Mul$t^{}$ (V)
$:= \bigcup_{n\in N}Mult_{n}^{C}(V)$
Such a multiverse has several accessibility relations: for each $C\in C$ , we would
have the notion $\leq c$ of $C$-accessibility as dened above. In addition to these paths
corresponding to a single construction method, we can consider mixed paths: if
$C^{*}\subseteq C$ is nonempty, we say that a model $MC^{*}$ -accesses another model $N$ (in
symbols, $M\leq c*N$) if there is a nite sequence $(M_{i};i\leq n)$ with $M_{0}=M,$
$M_{n}=N$ , and for each $i<n$ there is some $C\in C^{*}$ such that $M_{i+1}=C(M_{i},p)$ for
some $p$ such that $(M_{i}, p)$ is $C$-good.5 These accessibility relations can be studied
either individually or with a focus on their interactions (the results in \S 7.2, in
particular, Theorem 14, can be seen as an example of a bimodal setting with two
modalities).
$5$
Note that if $C^{*}=\{C\}$ , then $\leq c*is$ the transitive closure of $\leq c.$
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3. Modal logic and its applications
The propositional language of modal logic consists $of\wedge,$ $\vee,$ $\neg,$ $\perp,$ $\square$ and ◇ and propo-
sitional variables from a set Prop. Typically we read $\square \varphi$ as \it is necessary that
$\varphi$
" and ◇ $\varphi$ as \it is possible that $\varphi$ The following semantics for modal logic is
called Kripke semantics and was introduced by Kripke in [26]:
We call any directed graph $(K, E)$ a Kripke frame; if $v$ : Prop $arrow\wp(K)$ is a
function (called a valuation junction), we shall call $(K, E, v)$ a Kripke model. For
any Kripke model $(K, E, v)$ and $x\in K$ , we dene a satisfaction relation for modal
formulas recursively as follows:
$(K, E, v, x)\models p\Leftrightarrow x\in v(p)$ ,
$(K, E, v, x)\models\varphi\wedge\psi\Leftrightarrow(K, E, v_{\}}x)\models\varphi$ and $(K, E, v, x)\models\psi,$
$(K, E, v, x)\models\varphi\vee\psi\Leftrightarrow(K, E, v, x)\models\varphi or(K, E, v, x)\models\psi,$
$(K, E, v, x)\models\neg\varphi\Leftrightarrow(K, E, v, x)\#\varphi,$
$(K, E, v, x)\models\square \varphi\Leftrightarrow$ for all $y$ such that $xEy,$
we have that $(K, E, v, y)\models\varphi,$
$(K, E, v, x)\models$ ◇ $\varphi\Leftrightarrow$ there is a $y$ such that $xEy$
and $(K, E, v, y)\models\varphi.$
If $\varphi$ is a modal formula, we say that it is valid in $(K, E, v)$ if $(K, E, v, x)\models\varphi$
for every $x\in K$ . We say that it is valid in $(K, E)$ if it is valid in every Kripke
model on $(K, E)$ . If $\mathcal{K}$ is a class of Kripke frames, we write $ML(\mathcal{K})$ for the set of
modal formulas valid in all frames $(K, E)\in \mathcal{K}$ . Clearly, if $\mathcal{K}\subseteq \mathcal{K}'$ , then $ML(\mathcal{K}')\subseteq$
$ML(\mathcal{K})$ .
A set $\Lambda$ of modal formulas is called a modal logic if it contains all propositional
tautologies, is closed under modus ponens (i.e., if $\varphi\in$ A and $\varphiarrow\psi\in\Lambda$ , then
$\psi\in\Lambda)$ , uniform substitution (of propositional variables in a formula by arbitrary
formulas) and necessitation $(if \varphi\in\Lambda,$ then $\square \varphi\in\Lambda)$ . It is called normal if it
contains all instances of the scheme
(K) $\square (\varphiarrow\psi)arrow(\square \varphiarrow\square \psi)$ .
It satises duality if it contains all instances of the scheme
(Dual) $◇\varphirightarrow\neg\square _{\neg}\varphi.$
If is easy to see that for any class $\mathcal{K}$ of Kripke frames, the set $ML(\mathcal{K})$ is a normal
modal logic satisfying duality.
Theorem 2 (Kripke; [26]). We let $K$ be the smallest normal modal logic satisfying
duality and $\mathcal{K}$ be the class of all Kripke frames. Then $ML(\mathcal{K})=K.$
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The following modal formulas are not theorems of $K$ , as can be easily seen using
Theorem 2 by providing a Kripke model that invalidates them:
(T) $\square \varphiarrow\varphi$
(4) $\square \varphiarrow\square \square \varphi$
(.2) $◇\square \varphiarrow\square ◇\varphi$
(5) $◇\square \varphiarrow\varphi$
The modal logic $T$ is the minimal normal modal logic satisfying duality and
including all instances of (T). Similarly, S4 is the minimal normal modal logic sat-
isfying duality, extending $T$ and including all instances of (4), S4.2 is the minimal
normal modal logic satisfying duality, extending S4 and including all instances of
(.2), and S5 is the minimal normal modal logic satisfying duality, extending S4.2
and including all instances of (5).
The fundamental idea of Kripke semantics is that properties of the relation $E$ of
a Kripke frame $(K, E)$ directly correspond to the validity of modal formulas. This
idea is due to Kripke [26] and was the beginning of a rich literature of completeness
theorems for modal logics using the technique of canonical models (cf. [2, \S 4.2]).
Let us give a number of examples [2, Theorems 4.23, 4. $28$ & 4.29]:
Theorem 3. Let $\mathcal{K}_{r}$ be the class of all Kripke frames $(K, E)$ with a reexive relation
$E,$ $\mathcal{K}_{rt}$ be the class of all Kripke frames $(K, E)$ with a reexive and transitive
relation $E$ (also called partial pre-orders), $\mathcal{K}_{rtd}$ be the class of all Kripke frames
$(K, E)$ with a reexive, transitive and directed relation $E$ , and $\mathcal{K}_{rts}$ be the class of
all Kripke frames $(K, E)$ with a reexive, transitive and symmetric relation $E$ (also
called equivalence relations). Then
(1) $T=ML(\mathcal{K}_{r})$ ,
(2) $S4=ML(\mathcal{K}_{rt})$ ,
(3) S4.2 $=ML(\mathcal{K}_{rtd})$ , and
(4) $S5=ML(\mathcal{K}_{rts})$ .
It is important to note that Theorem 3 does not mean that every Kripke model
of a theory has to have the relational properties of the corresponding frame class:
e.g., there can be models $(K, E, v)\models$ S4 where the relation $E$ is not transitive.
This is important in our context, since we shall interpret the multiverses of \S 2 not
simply as Kripke frames, but as Kripke frames with a restriction on the valuations
on them we want to consider.6
A second crucial property of Kripke semantics is that for many examples of modal
logics $(in$ particular, $the$ modal logics $K, T, S4, S4.2, and S5$ dened above) , the
class of nite frames with the appropriate property is enough to dene the modal
logic. Theorems like this are usually proved with the technique of ltration (cf. [13,
pp. 267-268] or [2, pp. 77-82]). All of the modal logics listed in Theorem 3 have
the nite model property and the nite frame property:7
6Structures like this are known as general frames, cf. [2, \S 1.4].
7Cf. [2, Denitions 2. $27$ & 3.23], respectively. For normal modal logics, the nite model
property and the nite frame property are equivalent [2, Theorem 3.28].
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Theorem 4. Let $\mathcal{K}_{r}^{fin}$ be the class of all nite Kripke frames $(K, E)$ with a reexive
relation $E,$ $\mathcal{K}_{rt}^{fin}$ be the class of all nite Kripke frames $(K, E)$ with a reexive and
transitive relation $E,$ $\mathcal{K}_{rtd}^{fin}$ be the class of all nite Kripke frames $(K, E)$ with a
reexive, transitive and directed relation $E$ , and $\mathcal{K}_{rts}^{fin}$ be the class of all nite Kripke
frames $(K, E)$ with a $reexive_{f}$ transitive and symmetric relation E. Then
(1) $T=ML(\mathcal{K}_{r}^{fin})$ ,
(2) $S4=ML(\mathcal{K}_{rt}^{fin})$ ,
(3) S4.2 $=ML(\mathcal{K}_{rtd}^{fin})$ , and
(4) $S5=ML(\mathcal{K}_{rts}^{fin})$ .
4. Modal Logics of Multiverses
As in \S 2, we x a meta-universe V and a construction method C. For every model
of set theory $V$ , we can consider (Mult $(V),$ $\leq c$ ) as a Kripke frame. In our set
theoretic context, we are not interested in the purely algebraic properties of this
frame, but want to restrict our attention to valuations that connect with the set
theoretic properties of the multiverse under investigation. A valuation function
$v$ : Prop $arrow\wp(Mult^{C}(V))$ is called set theoretic if there is an assignment $p\mapsto\sigma_{p}$
assigning a sentence in the language of set theory to any propositional variable
in such a way that $v(p)=\{N\in$ Mult(V); $N\models\sigma_{p}\}$ . We call a Kripke model
(Multc(V), $\leq,$ $v$ ) set theoretic if $v$ is a set theoretic valuation function. We can now
dene the modal logic of the multiverse Mul$t^{}$ (V) by
$MLC_{V}:=$
$\{\varphi;\varphi$ is satised at $V$ in all set theoretic Kripke models on (Multc(V), $\leq c$
The following is a syntactic reformulation of the same concept (these denitions
are due to Inamdar and the second author [24]): Call a function $H$ a translation if
it assigns to each $p\in$ Prop a sentence $H(p)$ of the language of set theory. Then for
each model of set theory $V$ and every translation $H$ , we dene by recursion in the
meta-universe V:
$V\models_{c}^{H}p:\Leftrightarrow V\models H(p)$ ,
$V\models_{C}^{H}\varphi\wedge\psi$ $:\Leftrightarrow V\models_{C}^{H}\varphi$ and $M\models_{c}^{H}\psi,$
$V\models_{c}^{H}\varphi\vee\psi:\Leftrightarrow V\models_{c}^{H}\varphi$ or $M\models_{c}^{H}\psi,$
$V\models_{C}^{H}\neg\varphi$ $:\Leftrightarrow notV\models_{C}^{H}\varphi$ , and
$V\models_{c}^{H}\square \varphi:\Leftrightarrow\forall W(V\leq cWarrow W\models_{c}^{H}\varphi)$ .
Proposition 5. Let $V\in V$ be a model of set theory and $\varphi$ be a $for^{\tau}mula$ in the
language of modal propositional logic. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) The formula $\varphi$ is satised at $V$ in every set theoretic Kripke model
$($Mult $(V),$ $\leq c,$ $v)$ , and
(2) for every translation $H$ , we have $V\models_{C}^{H}\varphi.$
Proof. This is proved by induction on the complexity of the formula $\varphi.$ $\square$
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We can now dene the modal logic of the construction method $C$ by
MLC $:=\cap$ { $MLC_{V};V\models BST$ is a countable model}
where BST is our basic set theory (i.e., ZFC in almost all cases; cf. Footnote 4).
5. The Modal Logic of Forcing
We now phrase the modal logic of forcing, as investigated by Hamkins and the
second author in [19] in terms of our general framework. In this section, our base
theory is ZFC. As before, we x a meta-universe V and let $F$ be the operation that
assigns to a pair $(M, G)$ the generic extension $F(M, G)$ $:=M[G]$ if there is some
forcing partial order $\mathbb{P}\in M$ such that $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $M$ . Then for every model
$V\in V$ , we consider the Kripke frame (Mult $(V),$ $\leq F$ ).
5.1. Some words of caution about multiverses as structures. Since we are
emphasizing the second order set theory aspect of multiverses in this paper, it
is interesting to have a closer look at these forcing multiverses Mul$t^{}$ (V) that
are concrete structures from the point of view of the meta-universe V. The rst
observation is that they may trivialize: suppose that the meta-universe is a model
of $V=L+^{(}\kappa$ is an inaccessible cardinal" Let $V:=L_{\kappa}$ . Suppose $\gamma$ is the statement
\there is a Cohen real over $L$ " , then this statement is false everywhere in the
multiverse Mul$t^{}$ (V). This means that the structure Mul$t^{}$ (V) does not capture
the intuition of what is possible to achieve by forcing very well at all; in fact, in
the case of the forcing multiverse, we should restrict ourselves to countable models
$V$ in order to have that Mul$t^{}$ (V) is a structure that represents the \worlds made
possible by forcing"' (since in this case, generics for all forcing partial orders in $V$
exist in V by [27, Lemma VII.2.3]).
But even if $V$ is countable, we have to be careful with our structure Mul$t^{}$ (V):
if $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{Q}$ are forcing partial orders in some $W\in$ Mul$t^{}$ (V) and $G$ and $H$ are
$\mathbb{P}$-generic and $\mathbb{Q}$-generic over $W$ , respectively, we cannot assume that $G\cross H$ would
be $\mathbb{P}\cross \mathbb{Q}$-generic. In fact, $G\cross H$ is $\mathbb{P}\cross \mathbb{Q}$-generic if and only if $G$ and $H$ are
mutually generic, i.e., $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $W[H]$ and $H$ is $\mathbb{Q}$-generic over $W[G][27,$
VIII.1.4]. But by a simple argument due to Woodin, if $V$ is countable and $x\in\omega^{\omega}$
witnesses the countability of $V$ , then there are two Cohen reals $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ over $V$
such that any model of set theory containing both $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ will also contain $x$
(we call the generic extensions $V[c_{1}]$ and $V[c_{2}]$ non-amalgamable). Consequently,
there can be no forcing extension of $V$ that contains both $c_{1}$ and $c_{2}$ . This means
that the preorder (Mult $(V),$ $\leq F$ ) is not directed. Since we are restricting our
attention to set theoretic valuations, this does not preclude the scheme (.2) from
being valid in the modal logic of forcing: suppose that $\mathbb{P}$ forces some statement $\sigma$
to be necessarily true and $\mathbb{Q}$ forces some other statement $\tau$ to be necessarily true,
then there are pairs of mutual generics and $\mathbb{P}\cross \mathbb{Q}$ forces $\sigma\wedge\tau$ to be necessarily
true, even if for some choices of generics $G$ and $H$ , the extensions $V[G]$ and $V[H]$
may be non-amalgamable in the above sense.
As a third example, let us consider a countable non-wellfounded $V$ of set theory.
For countable transitive models of set theory, we dene the generic extension as
the Mostowski collapse of the quotient structure on the set of names, so generic
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extensions are again transitive countable models of set theory. In particular, if $\mathbb{P}$
in V and $\dot{\mathbb{Q}}$ in $V^{\mathbb{P}}$ is a name for a forcing partial order and if $H$ is $\mathbb{P}*\dot{\mathbb{Q}}$-generic
over $V$ , then $H$ splits into a $\mathbb{P}$-generic lter $G_{0}$ over $V$ and a $\mathbb{Q}$-generic lter $G_{1}$
over $V[G_{0}]$ such that $V[G_{0}][G_{1}]=V[H].$
If $V$ is not wellfounded, then we shall not be able to produce a transitive model
corresponding to its generic extension, i.e., we have to work with the quotient
structure on the set of names itself. This means that in the above situation, $V[H]$
will be isomorphic to $V[G_{0}][G_{1}]$ , but will not be the same set. As a consequence,
the multiverse is not literally transitive, but only transitive up to isomorphism. $A$
similar observation can be made with respect to reexivity. For more on forcing
over non-wellfounded models, cf. [4].
5.2. The syntactic description of the modal logic of forcing. The character-
isation via translations from Proposition 5 becomes highly relevant in this context
since the Forcing Theorem [27, Theorem VII.3.6] tells us that for every sentence $\sigma$
of the language of set theory, we have that $\sigma$ is true in every generic extension of a
countable model $M$ of set theory if and only if
$M\models\forall \mathbb{P}(|\vdash_{\mathbb{P}}\varphi)$
where $\mathbb{P}$ ranges over all partial orders and $|\vdash_{\mathbb{P}}$ is the forcing relation recursively
dened with parameter $\mathbb{P}$ [ $27$ , Denition VII.3.3]. This means that the second
order denition of $\models_{C}^{H}$ from \S 4 can be replaced by a purely syntactic rst order
transformation of formulas:
A function $H\in V$ that takes a formula $\varphi$ of the language of modal logic and




$H(\varphi\vee\psi)=H(\varphi)\vee H(\psi)$ , and
$H(\square \varphi)=\forall \mathbb{P}(|\vdash {}_{\mathbb{P}}H(\varphi))$ .
Proposition 6. Suppose that $V$ is a countable model of set theory and $H$ is a
Hamkins translation. Then $H_{0}:=H$ [Prop is a translation in the sense of \S 4 and
furthermore, for all formulas $\varphi$ in the language of modal propositional logic, the
following are equivalent:
(1) $V\models H(\varphi)$ and
(2) $V\models_{F}^{H_{0}}\varphi.$
Proof. Induction on the complexity of formulas, where the only nontrivial step is
$\varphi=\square \psi$ :
$V\models_{F}^{H_{0}}\varphi\Leftrightarrow\forall W(V\leq FWarrow W\models_{F}^{H_{0}}\psi)$
$\Leftrightarrow\forall W(V\leq FWarrow W\models H(\psi))$
$\Leftrightarrow V\models\forall \mathbb{P}(|\vdash {}_{\mathbb{P}}H(\psi))$
$\Leftrightarrow V\models H(\varphi)$ ,
12
MODAL LOGICS AND MULTIVERSES
where the second line is the induction hypothesis and for the third equivalence we
use the Forcing Theorem and the fact that for any countable model of set theory
there are generic lters for every forcing. Furthermore we use that any forcing
extension of a countable model is countable again, which follows from the fact that
there is a surjection from the class of names in the ground model to the elements
of the forcing extension. $\square$
Using Propositions 5 and 6, we obtain that
MLF $=\cap$ { $MLF_{V};V\models ZFC$ is a countable model}
$=$ { $\varphi;V\models_{F}^{H}\varphi$ for all countable models $V\models ZFC$ and all translations $H$}
$=$ { $\varphi;ZFC\vdash H(\varphi)$ for all Hamkins translations $H$ }.
Theorem 7 (Hamkins). For every model $V\models ZFC,$ $S4.2\subseteq MLF_{V}$ . Consequently,
S4.2 $\subseteq$ MLF. There are models $W$ and $W'$ such that S5 $\subseteq MLF_{W}$ and S5 $\not\subset$
$MLF_{W'}^{8}$
The validity of S4.2 is closely connected to closure properties of the multiverses
Mul$t^{}$ $(V)_{1}$ e.g., the validity of (4) related to the iteration lemma in the theory of
forcing [27, VIII.5.5], which essentially expresses that forcing is transitive (up to
isomorphism), and the validity of (.2) is related to the product lemma [27, Theorem
VIII.1.4$]^{}$
Theorem 8 (Hamkins-L\"owe). The modal logic of forcing is exactly S4.2.
In \S 6, we shall sketch the general proof strategy for Theorem 8 in our setting. In
order to motivate why results like Theorem 8 are relevant, we show that it implies
that there can be no pure forcing proof for the mentioned result by Hamkins and
Stavi-V\"a\"an\"anen (Theorem 7 and Footnote 8).
Corollary 9. There can be no pure forcing proof of the existence of a model $N$
such that $S5\subseteq MLF_{N}.$
Proof. By a pure forcing proof, we mean that ZFC proves that you can force the
modal logic of forcing to include S5. This statement itself can be rendered as
$◇ (◇\square parrow p)\in MLF$ . But ◇ (◇ $\square$p $arrow$ p) is not a theorem of S4.2 in contradiction
to Theorem 8. $\square$
6. The general proof strategy
Theorem 8 is the prototypical result we are going to discuss in this paper in the
multiverse setting. We give a description of the proof strategy for Theorem 8 in
such a way that it can be generalized to modal logics of multiverses for any other
construction method $C$ :
Step 1.: We rst guess a candidate modal logic $\Lambda$ of which we aim to show
that MLC $=\Lambda.$
Step 2.: For the lower bound, we show $\Lambda\subseteq MLC$ by showing the validity of
all axioms of A in every model $V\models BST.$
$8The$ existence of a model $W$ such that S5 $\subseteq MLF_{W}$ was proved independently in [33].
9Cf. [29] and [18, Theorem 7].
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Step $3a.$ : For the upper bound, we rst nd an appropriate class $\mathcal{K}$ of Kripke
frames such that $\Lambda=ML(\mathcal{K})$ .
Step $3b.$ : We prove a transfer lemma by giving a condition in terms of
so-called control statements (cf., e.g., Lemma 12 (3)) under which modal
truth from one of the frames in $\mathcal{K}$ can be transferred to a model $V\models BST$
validating
Step $3c.$ : We nd a model $V\models BST$ validating
Concerning the lower bounds (Step 2), these are typically connected with the
closure properties of the relation $\leq$ in the investigated multiverse. For instance, if
$\leq c$ is reexive (up to isomorphisms), then $T\subseteq$ MLC. This was investigated for
classes of forcing in [29] (cf. also [18, Theorem 7
Hamkins, Leibman, and the second author also provided the abstract background
for the transfer lemmas needed for Step $3b[18]$ : Let $(K, E)$ be a Kripke frame with
$g\in K$ and $v:$ Prop $arrow\wp(K)$ be a valuation function. Furthermore, let $V\models$ BST
and let $H$ be a translation. We say that that $H$ transfers truth between $(K, E, v, g)$
and $V$ with respect to $C$ if for every modal formula $\varphi$ we have that
$(K, E, v, g)\models\varphi\Leftrightarrow V\models_{c}^{H}\varphi.$
If $(K, E)$ is a nite Kripke frame, $V$ a model of set theory, and $g_{0}\in K$ . We say
that $\{\Phi_{g};g\in K\}$ is a $C$ -labelling of $(K, E, g_{0})$ for $V$ if each of the $\Phi_{9}$ is a sentence
in the language of set theory such that
(1) in each model of set theory $W\in Mult^{C}(V)$ exactly one $\Phi_{g}$ is true,
(2) $V\models\Phi_{90}$
(3) if $h,$ $h'\in K$ and $W\models\Phi_{h}$ then $hEh'$ if and only if there is some $W'$ with
$W\leq cW'$ and $W'\models\Phi_{h'}.$
We give an example of how this general proof strategy works in terms of the
modal logic of forcing given in \S 5:
The candidate modal logic for MLF was S4.2 (Step 1) and Theorem 7 had
established that $S4.2\subseteq MLF$ (Step 2). Concerning Step $3a$ , Theorem 3 already
provides us with a class of Kripke models, viz. the class of nite directed partial
pre-orders. However, this class can be slightly rened in order to allow us to prove
the transfer lemma.
As usual, pre-orders (reexive and transitive relations) carry a natural notion
of equivalence: If $(K, \leq)$ is a pre-order, let $\equiv$ be dened by $v\equiv w$ if and only if
$v\leq w\leq v$ . Clearly, $\leq$ is well-dened on the $\equiv$-equivalence classes, so with a slight
abuse of notation, we can consider the quotient structure $(K/\equiv, \leq)$ . For any class $\mathcal{O}$
of ordered structures, we say that a pre-order $(K, \leq)$ is $pre-\mathcal{O}$ if $(K/\equiv, \leq)\in \mathcal{O}$ . E.g.,
pre-lattices or pre-Boolean algebras are pre-orders such that the natural quotient
by $\equiv$ becomes a lattice or a Boolean algebra, respectively.
Theorem 10 $(Hamkins-L\ddot{o}we;[19$ , Theorem 11 A modal formula is in S4.2 if
and only if it is valid in all Kripke frames whose edge relation is a nite pre-Boolean
algebra.
In Step $3b$ , we need to nd the right control statements that allow us to prove a
transfer theorem for nite pre-Boolean algebras. The notions isolated by Hamkins
and the second author are buttons and switches.
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Denition 11. A sentence $b$ in the language of set theory is a button if it is
necessarily possibly necessary $;^{1\fbox{Error::0x0000}}$ it is unpushed in a model $V$ of set theory, if
$V\models\neg b$ . A sentence $s$ is called a switch if both $s$ and $\neg s$ are necessarily possible.
An example button in the case of forcing is $\omega_{1}^{L}<\omega_{1}$ which is unpushed in $L$ , but
can be pushed by collapsing $\omega_{1}^{L}$ by forcing (note that it remains true in all further
forcing extensions; cf. Footnote 2); an example switch is CH which can be forced to
be true or false over every model of set theory (cf. Theorem 1).
Suppose that $V$ is a model of set theory. If $B$ is a set of buttons and $S$ is a
set of switches, then $B\cup S$ is called an independent family of buttons and switches
over $V$ if all buttons are unpushed in $V$ and for every $V^{*},$ $B'\subseteq B$ and $S'\subseteq S$ , if
$V\leq cV^{*}$ and $B^{*}$ is the set of buttons pushed in $V^{*}$ , then there is some $V'$ such
that $V^{*}\leq cV'$ and $B^{*}\cup B'$ is the set of buttons pushed in $V'$ and $S'$ is the set of
switches true in $V'.$
Lemma 12 (Transfer Lemma). (1) If there is $a$ $V\models$ ZFC such that for every
nite pre-Boolean algebra $(K, \leq)$ , every valuation function $v$ , and every $g\in$
$K$ , there is a Hamkins translation that transfers truth between $(K, \leq, v, g)$
and $V$ with respect to $F$ , then the modal logic of forcing is contained in S4.2.
(2) Let $(K, \leq)$ be a nite pre-Boolean algebra, $V$ a model of set theory, and
$g_{0}\in K$ such that there is an $F$ -labelling of $(K, \leq, g_{0})$ for V. Then for every
valuation function $v$ there is $a$ a Hamkins translation $H$ that transfers truth
between $(K, \leq, v, g_{0})$ and $V$ with respect to F.
(3) Let $(K, \leq)$ be nite pre-Boolean algebra with $9\in K$ and $V$ a model of set
theory with an independent family of buttons and switches of su cient sizeli
then there is an $F$ -labelling of $(K, \leq, g)$ for $V.$
Proof (1) Suppose $\psi$ is not a theorem of S4.2. Then by Theorem 10, there is a
nite pre-Boolean algebra $(K, \leq)$ , a valuation $v$ , and a $g\in K$ such that
$(K, \leq, v, g)\models\neg\psi.$
By the assumption, there is a Hamkins translation $H$ transferring truth between
$(K, \leq, v, g)$ and $V$ , so $V\models\neg H(\psi)$ . Consequently, $\psi\not\in MLF.$
The proofs of (2) and (3) can be found in [18, Lemma 9] and [18, Theorem 13],
respectively. $\square$
Finally, in Step $3c$ , Hamkins and the second author proved that any model sat-
isfying $V=L$ has an independent family with innitely many buttons and switches,
thus completing the proof [19, Lemma6.1]. It should be mentioned that we do
not know how to prove independence of the buttons given in the original proof of
[19, Lemma6.1] (this was observed in [32]), but numerous other innite families of
buttons have been provided of which independence can be proved (cf. [18, \S 4]).l2
$1\fbox{Error::0x0000}.$ , if $H$ is a translation such that $H(p)=b$ , then for every model $V$ of set theory, $V\models_{C}^{H}$
$\square$◇ $\square$p.
liIt is sucient that the family has as many buttons as the quotient Boolean algebra $K/\equiv$
has atoms and as many switches as the largest $\equiv$-class in $K$ has elements.
$12The$ independence of the original list of buttons remains an interesting problem: Inamdar
observed that a theorem by Abraham from [1] implies a certain fragment of independence [23,
\S 6].
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Figure 1. The rst three spiked Boolean algebras
7. Generalizations and open questions
7.1. Restricting the class of forcings. The rst generalisation that was pro-
posed in the original paper [19] was fragments of the forcing multiverse generated
by particular types of forcing. Fix any class $\Gamma$ of forcing partial orders and let $F_{\Gamma}$
be the construction that only allows generic extensions with partial order $\mathbb{P}\in\Gamma.$
Examples are the classes of proper forcings or c.c, $c$ . forcings.
As mentioned before, the lower bounds in Step 2 of our proof strategy are
very closely related to closure properties of the class $\Gamma$ [ $18$ , Theorem 7]. Hamkins,
Leibman and the second author have provided a number of other control statements
that give rise to proofs of upper bounds and the appropriate transfer theorems,
showing that the modal logic of proper forcing and of c.c. $c$ . forcing are contained
within a modal logic called S4.3, which properly extends S4.2 [18, Corollary 33
(1)$]^{}$
The most interesting open problem in this direction is to determine the modal
logic of c.c. $c$ . forcing $MLF_{c.c.c}.\cdot$ Here, we know that the axiom (.2) is not valid
[19, Theorem 34], so the upper bound given by Hamkins, Leibman and the second
author cannot be optimal. The currently best known result is due to Inamdar: if
$(B, \leq)$ is a nite Boolean algebra with $n$ atoms and $n$ co-atoms $\{c_{i};1\leq i\leq n\},$
we dene a spiked Boolean algebra by adding $n$ additional nodes $\{d_{i};1\leq i\leq n\}$
such that for every $b\in B$ , we have $b\leq d_{i}$ if and only if $b\leq c_{i}$ . The spiked Boolean
algebras for the Boolean algebras with two, four and eight elements can be seen
in Figure 1. We let $S4.sBA$ be the set of all modal assertions which are true on
all Kripke models whose frame is a nite pre-spiked Boolean algebra. It can be
checked that $S4.sBA$ is properly contained in S4.2 [23, Theorem 121].
Theorem 13 (Inamdar; [23, Theorem 150 $S4\subseteq MLF_{c.c.c}.$ $\subseteq S4.sBA.$
7.2. Reversing the arrows. The operation $F$ corresponds to the relation of
$\langle$
be-
ing a generic extension" The inverse of this relation is the relation of \being a
ground model"' More precisely, the operation $G$ is dened on pairs $(M, G)$ such
that there is some inner model $N\subseteq M$ such that there is some partial order
$\mathbb{P}\in N$ and we have that $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $N$ and $M=N[G]$ . In that case,
13The modal logic S4.3 is generated from S4.2 by including all instances of $◇ p\wedge$ ◇ q $arrow$
◇ ((p $\wedge$ ◇ q) $\vee(q\wedge$ ◇ p It is characterized by the class of nite pre-linear orders [2, Exercise 4.33,
Theorem 4.96, & Lemma 6.40].
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$G(M, G):=N$ . The modal logic of grounds $MLG_{V}$ is dened by using the general
denitions of \S 4 applied to $G^{14}$
The multiverses Mul$t^{}$ (V) can look quite dierent from the multiverses Mul$t^{}$ (V):
if $V$ is a countable transitive model of set theory, then Mul$t^{}$ (V) will not have a
$\leq F$-largest element since for each $M\in$ Mul$t^{}$ (V), there are many proper generic
extensions; on the other hand, if $V$ is a generic extension of $L^{V}$ , then $L^{V}$ will be a
$\leq G$-largest element in the multiverse Mul$t^{}$ (V). In such a $\leq G$-largest element of
the multiverse, all statements that are true are necessarily true, and hence
(Top) $◇ ((\square \varphirightarrow\varphi)\wedge(\coprod_{\neg\varphi}rightarrow\neg\varphi))$
is a valid principle in $V$ . Note that (Top) is not a theorem of S5 and compare
this to the result by Hamkins and the second author that for every model $V$ of set
theory, $MLF_{V}\subseteq S5$ [ $19$ , Theorem 15].
The phenomenon just discussed is closely related to what Hamkins calls set
theoretic geology [16, 11]: $a\leq G$ -largest element of the multiverse Mul$t^{}$ (V) would
be a bedrock [11, Denition 2]; if Mul$t^{}$ (V) contains a bedrock, then (Top) is in
$MLG_{V}$ . Using the so-called bottomless models of Reitz, Hamkins and the second
author have been able to show that S4.2 is an upper bound for the modal logic of
grounds. In fact,
Theorem 14 (Hamkins-L\"owe; [20, Theorems 7-10]). There are models $V,$ $W$ , and
$U$ of set theory such that
(1) $MLF_{V}=S4.2$ and $MLG_{V}=S4.2,$
(2) $MLF_{W}=S4.2$ and $MLG_{W}=S5$ , and
(3) $MLF_{U}=S5$ and $MLG_{U}=S4.2.$
Furthermore there is no model $V$ of set theory such that $MLF_{V}=S5$ and $MLG_{V}=$
S5.
With the upper bound established, we wonder about the lower bound for MLG.
It is easy to check that S4 $\subseteq$ MLG, but the scheme (.2) is equivalent to the
following set theoretic statement:
Let $V$ be a model of set theory, and $W$ and $U$ two grounds of $V,$
i.e., $V=W[G]=U[H]$ for some generic lters $G$ and $H$ . Then
(DDG) there is some model $K$ which is a ground of both $W$ and $U$ , i.e.,
there are $K$-generic lters $G^{*}$ and $H^{*}$ such that $K[G^{*}]=W$ and
$K[H^{*}]=U.$
Clearly, if a multiverse has $a\leq G$-largest element, then (DDG) is trivially true (e.g.,
in multiverses generated from a generic extension of $L$ or any other core model).
There are multiverses without such $a\leq G$-largest element (Reitz's bottomless model
from [31]) where we still know that (DDG) is true (cf. [20, Theorem 6 However,
the general status of (DDG) is unknown and is an interesting question in its own
right. E.g., is it consistent to have a grounds multiverse with two separate bedrocks?
$14As$ in the case of the modal logic of forcing, the modal logic of grounds admits a purely
syntactic denition via syntactic translation operations due to the Laver-Woodin theorem [28];
cf. also [11, Theorem 8].
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Figure 2. Three inverted lollipops
7.3. Inner models. The following example is similar and yet dierent to the
modal logic of grounds from \S 7.2. We consider the operation that takes a model
$V$ of set theory, a formula $\Phi$ , and some parameters $p$ to form the $V$-class $X$ $:=$
$\{x\in V|\Phi(x,p)\}$ , dened in our meta-universe V. We say that the pair $(V, (\Phi,p))$
is $I$-good if $X$ is an inner model of $V$ , i.e., a model of set theory having the same
ordinals as $M$ . As before, the construction operation I denes multiverses for every
model V of set theory in our meta-universe V.
For a model $V$ , there is a close relationship between Mul$t^{}$ (V) and Mul$t^{}$ (V).
Clearly, all grounds are inner models, but moreover, Grigorie's theorem tells us
more about the relationship between $\leq G$ and $\leq 1$ :
Theorem 15 (Grigorie; [14]). Let $V$ be a transitive model of ZFC, $W$ a forcing
extension of $V$ and $U$ a transitive model of ZFC such that $V\subseteq U\subseteq W$ . Then $U$ is
a forcing extension of $V.$
Consequently, the relation $\leq G$ is an initial segment of the relation $\leq 1$ in the
following sense: if $V\leq IU,$ $U\leq IW$ , and $V\leq GW$ , then $V\leq GU.$
So, Mul$t^{}$ (V) nicely embeds into Mul$t^{}$ (V), but in general, the inner model
multiverse can be quite dierent from the grounds multiverse: the inner mod-
els multiverse always has a $\leq 1$-largest element, viz. $L^{V}$ (of course, $L^{V}$ is only in
Mul$t^{}$ (V) if $V$ is a generic extension of $L^{V}$ ). As discussed in \S 7.2, this means that
the axiom scheme (Top) is valid in Mul$t^{}$ (V) for all models of set theory $V.$
We let $S4.2Top$ be the modal logic obtained from S4.2 by adding all instances
of (Top). The above argument tells us that $S4.2Top$ is alower bound for the modal
logic of inner models MLI. In order to show that it is also an upper bound, we
need to follow Step $3a$ , Step $3b$ , and Step $3c$ of \S 6.
Inamdar and the second author did this analysis in [24]. A partial pre-order
is topped if it has a unique largest element; it is called an inverted lollipop if it is
topped and after removal of the largest element, the remainder is a pre-Boolean
algebra (cf. Figure 2 to see three inverted lollipops). If $\mathcal{K}_{IL}^{fin}$ is the class of nite
inverted lollipops, then $S4.2Top=ML(\mathcal{K}_{IL}^{fin})$ [ $24$ , Theorem 6].
Theorem 16 (Inamdar-L\"owe; [24, Theorem 19 MLI $=S4.2Top.$
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7.4. Symmetric extensions. In this section, we shall work in ZF as the base
theory (cf. Footnote 4). As before, we x a meta-universe V of a reasonably strong
set theory and remind the reader of the basic denitions of symmetric extensions: 15
Let $\Gamma$ be a group. Then a set $\mathcal{F}\subseteq$ { $\triangle;\triangle$ is a subgroup of $\Gamma$ } is called a normal
lter over $\Gamma$ i it satises the following four properties:16
(1) $\Gamma\in \mathcal{F}$ ;
(2) if $\triangle\in \mathcal{F}$ and $\Delta'$ is a subgroup of $\Gamma$ such that $\triangle\subseteq\Delta'$ , then $\Delta'\in \mathcal{F}$ ;
(3) for any two $\Delta,$ $\triangle'\in$ ノ e, also $\triangle\cap\Delta'\in$ ノ
(4) for any $\Delta\in \mathcal{F}$ and $g\in\Gamma$ we have that $g\triangle g^{-1}:=\{fdf^{-1};d\in\Delta\}\in \mathcal{F}.$
Let $V$ be a transitive modell7 of ZF, $\mathbb{P}\in M$ a forcing partial order, $\Gamma\in Va$
subgroup of the group $Aut(\mathbb{P})$ of automorphisms of $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathcal{F}\in V$ a normal lter
over $\Gamma$ . We call a $\mathbb{P}$-name $\tau$ hereditarily $\mathcal{F}$-symmetric i $sym_{\Gamma}(\tau)$ $:=\{g\in\Gamma;g(\tau)=$
$\tau\}\in\overline{ノ-}$ and for every $\langle\sigma,$ $p\rangle\in\tau$ we have that $\sigma$ is already hereditarily $\overline{f-}$-symmetric.
Let $G\subseteq \mathbb{P}$ be a generic lter over $V$ . Then we set
$V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]$ $:=$ { $\tau_{G};\tau$ is hereditarily $\mathcal{F}$-symmetric},
where $\tau^{G}$ denotes the interpretation of the name $\tau$ in the forcing extension $V[G].$
We call $V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]$ the symmetric extension of $V$ via $\mathcal{F}$ and $G.$
It is not hard to see that in the notation of the above denition $V\subseteq V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]\subseteq$
$V[G]$ . Also, $V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]\models ZF$ . Contrary to forcing extensions, symmetric extensions do
not necessarily satisfy the axiom of choice whenever the ground model does.
Let $V$ be a model of set theory. We say that $(V, (G, \mathcal{F}))$ is $S$-good if there is a
partial order $\mathbb{P}\in M$ for which $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $V,$ $\Gamma$ is a subgroup of $Aut(\mathbb{P})$ , and
$\overline{ノ r}$ is a normal lter over $\Gamma$ . We then dene the operation $S(V, (G, \mathcal{F}))$ $:=V_{\mathcal{F}}[G].$
The multiverse dened using the operation $S$ is called the symmetric extension
multiverse. Note that every forcing extension $V[G]${where $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $V-$
is a symmetric extension by taking the trivial normal lter containing all subgroups
of Aut ( $\mathbb{P}$ ) .
As in the case of the forcing multiverse and the grounds multiverse, we can
provide a purely syntactic description of the modal logic of symmetric extensions:
By restricting quantiers to hereditarily symmetric names (cf. [6]) we can dene
for every formula $\varphi(v_{1}, \ldots, v_{n})$ of set theory a formula $|\vdash_{v_{n+1},v_{n+2}}\varphi(v_{1}, \ldots, v_{n})$ in
the language of set theory such that for any transitive model $V\models ZF$ , any forcing
$\mathbb{P}\in M$ and any normal lter $\overline{\sqrt{}-}\in M$ over a subgroup of $Aut(\mathbb{P})$ and for names
$\sigma_{1}$ , . . . , $\sigma_{n}\in M^{\mathbb{P}}$ we have an analogue of the forcing theorem:
Proposition 17. The following are equivalent:
(1) $V\models|\vdash_{\mathbb{P},\mathcal{F}}\varphi(\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n})$ and
(2) for every generic $G\subseteq \mathbb{P}:V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]\models\varphi(\sigma_{1}^{G}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}^{G})$ .
15For more details, cf. [25].
l6We alert the reader to the fact that this normality of lters is entirely dierent from the
normality condition of ultralters in the theory of measurable cardinals.
$17The$ restriction to transitive models here and in the following only has the purpose to simplify
notation. We could work with arbitrary (countable) models in this section, with only the cost of
replacing identity of models with identity up to isomorphism in some places.
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Using this, we can now say that a function $S$ from the set of modal formulas




$S(\square \varphi)=\forall \mathbb{P}\forall \mathcal{F}(|\vdash_{\mathbb{P}},{}_{\mathcal{F}}S(\varphi))$ ,
where $\mathbb{P}$ ranges over partial orders and $\mathcal{F}$ ranges over normal lters over a subgroup
of Aut ($\mathbb{P}$) . We then get that
MLS $=\cap$ { $MLS_{V}|V\models ZF$ is a countable model}
$=$ { $\varphi;ZF\vdash S(\varphi)$ for all symmetric extension translations $S$}.
Theorem 18 (Block). MLS $=S4.2.$
The remainder of this paper will be a proof of Theorem 18. We start with Step
2, the lower bound.
Theorem 19 (Grigorie; [14]). If $V$ is a transitive model of ZF, $\mathbb{P}\in V$ a forcing,
$\mathcal{F}\in V$ a normal lter over a subgroup of $Aut(\mathbb{P})$ and $G\subseteq \mathbb{P}$ a generic lter over
$V$ , then $V[G]$ is a forcing extension of $V_{\mathcal{F}}[G].$
Lemma 20. $S4.2\subseteq MLS.$
Proof. The relation $\leq s$ is reexive and transitive (up to isomorphisms), so we get
that $S4\subseteq MLS$ (cf. [18, Theorem 7 In order to show (.2), we x a sentence $\sigma$
and suppose that in some countable model $V,$ $\sigma$ is possibly necessary, i.e., there
is some $\mathbb{P}$ and some lter $\mathcal{F}$ over a subgroup of $Aut(\mathbb{P})$ such that $|\vdash_{\mathbb{P},\mathcal{F}}\square \sigma^{18}$
Towards a contradiction, we suppose that $\sigma$ is also possibly necessarily false, i.e.,
there is some $\mathbb{Q}$ and some lter $\mathcal{G}$ over a subgroup of $Aut(\mathbb{Q})$ such that $|\vdash \mathbb{Q},\mathcal{G}\square \neg\sigma.$
Then consider the forcing $\mathbb{P}\cross \mathbb{Q}$ ; since $V$ was countable, we nd a $\mathbb{P}\cross \mathbb{Q}$-generic
$G\cross H$ such that $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $V[H]$ and $H$ is $\mathbb{Q}$-generic over $V[G]$ . By our
assumption, $V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]\models\square \sigma$ and $V_{\mathcal{G}}[H]\models\square \neg\sigma$ , but by Theorem 19, we have that
$V_{\mathcal{F}}[G]\leq sV[G\cross H]$ and $V_{\mathcal{G}}[H]\leq sV[G\cross H]$ . Contradiction. $\square$
Now, for the upper bound we shall give an independent families of innitely
many switches and buttons with respect to symmetric extensions over any model
of $V=L$ . Here and in the following, we use the notation $L$ for one such model,
arbitrarily chosen. As in [18, Theorem 15], we can construct independent switches
from a uniform independent family of buttons, indexed by the ordinals.
Let
$b(\alpha)$ $:=\aleph_{\alpha+1}^{L}$ is not a cardinal or $T_{\alpha}^{L}$ is not an $\aleph_{\alpha+1}^{L}$ -Suslin tree,
where $T_{\alpha}^{L}$ denotes the $L$-least well-pruned $\aleph_{\alpha+1}^{L}$ -Suslin treel9 These statements
are due to FYiedman, Fuchino, and Sakai who proved in ZFC that they form an
independent family of buttons with respect to forcing [8], If we live in an inner
180nce more, by $\square \sigma$ , we mean $S(\square p)$ for any symmetric translation $S$ such that
$S(p)=\sigma.$
19For denitions, cf. [27, Chapter II].
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model of a set forcing extension of $L$ , then a proper class of the buttons $b(\alpha)$ are
unpushed. Let $\lambda_{b}$ be the least limit ordinal such $b(\lambda_{b})$ is not pushed. For $n\in\omega,$
we now dene buttons $b_{n}:=b(n)$ and switches $s_{n}:=b(\lambda_{b}+n+1)$ . Clearly, the $b_{n}$
are buttons with respect to symmetric extensions and are unpushed in L. Also we
have the following:
Lemma 21. Let $M$ be a symmetric extension of L. Working in $M$ , let $A:=\{\alpha<$
$\lambda_{b};b(\alpha)\}$ and let $B\supset A$ be an arbitrary superset of ordinals. Then there is a
forcing $\mathbb{P}(B)$ such that $|\vdash_{\mathbb{P}(A,B)}(\check{B}=\{\alpha;b(\alpha)\})$ .
Proof. We work in $M$ . Let $\mathbb{P}(B):=\prod_{\alpha\in B\backslash A}^{fin}T_{\alpha}^{L}$ , where $\prod^{fin}$ denotes the nite
support product. Then for any $\alpha\in B$ we have that $|\vdash_{\mathbb{P}(B)}b(\check{\alpha})$ .
Now we note that for any $\alpha\in Ord\backslash A$ , the forcing $T_{\alpha}^{L}$ is $<\aleph_{\alpha+1}$ -closed and
$\aleph_{\alpha+2}$ -Knaster (using the canonical well-ordering of $T_{\alpha}^{L}$ in L). Now let $\beta\in Ord\backslash B.$
Then we get that $\prod_{\alpha\in B\backslash A},{}_{\alpha<\beta}T_{\alpha}^{L}$ is $\aleph_{\beta+1}$ -Knaster and $\prod_{\alpha\in B\backslash A},{}_{\alpha>\beta}T_{\alpha}^{L}$ is $<\aleph_{\beta+1^{-}}$
closed. Therefore $\mathbb{P}(B)$ preserves the Suslinness of $\beta$ by [5, Proposition 5], where
we use a well-ordering of $T_{\beta}^{L}$ . Hence we have for any $\beta\in Ord\backslash B$ that $|\vdash_{\mathbb{P}(B)^{\neg}}b(\beta)$ ,
which shows the claim. $\square$
As a consequence we get that the $s_{n}$ are indeed switches over $L$ with respect to
symmetric forcing. Moreover we get the following:
Lemma 22. The set $\{b_{n};n\in\omega\}\cup\{s_{n}n\in\omega\}$ is an independent set of buttons
and switches over $L$ with respect to symmetric extensions.
Proof That $\{b_{n};n\in\omega\}$ is an independent family of buttons over $L$ with respect to
symmetric extensions follows directly from Lemma 21. Now we work in a symmetric
extension $M$ of $L$ and let $S\subseteq\omega$ . Then let $\mu$ be the least limit ordinal such that for
all $\alpha\geq\mu,$ $b(\alpha)$ is not pushed, and let $B:=\{\alpha;\omega\leq\alpha<\mu\}\cup\{\mu+n+1;n\in S\}.$
Then by Lemma 21 in any forcing extension of $M$ via $\mathbb{P}(B)$ , we have $\lambda_{b}=\mu$ and the
switches in $\{s_{n};n\in S\}$ hold and the switches in $\{s_{n};n\in\omega\backslash S\}$ do not hold. $\square$
This lemma together with Lemma 12 $fo1^{\cdot}$ symmetric forcing and Lemma 20 es-
tablishes Theorem 18.
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